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Simultaneous contrasta b s t r a c t
The anchoring theory of lightness perception (Gilchrist et al., Psychological Review 106 (1999) 795–834)
has been described as one of the most successful approaches to lightness perception. Yet, not only does
the original proposal contain serious gaps and inconsistencies, later expressions of the theory, which was
never formally revised, seem to contradict the original claims while leaving the gaps unresolved. These
problems call into question the theory’s viability.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.How does the visual system decide whether to label a particular
surface light, medium, or dark? The surface’s luminance – the
amount of light it is reﬂecting to the eye – is not a sufﬁcient guide.
True, a light surface reﬂects a high proportion of the light falling on
it, a darker surface a smaller proportion. This characteristic propor-
tion of light reﬂected by a particular surface, called its reﬂectance,
and is what is expressed in the percept as lightness. But a high
reﬂectance (e.g. a white) surface in low light may have the same
or lower luminance than a low reﬂectance (e.g. a black) surface in
bright light. So ranking surfaces on the basis of their luminance will
not necessarily produce a correct estimate of their reﬂectance/light-
ness. We must ﬁrst factor out illumination. But, like reﬂectance,
illumination can only be ascertained on the basis of surfaces’ lumi-
nance. This being the case, the only way to estimate relative reﬂec-
tance is to ﬁrst segregate surfaces lying within an area of common
illumination, and then to rank them on the basis of their luminance.
Now, relative reﬂectance will closely parallel relative luminance.
The question then becomes, how does the visual system achieve
this useful, lightness constancy-enabling segregation, and howdoes
it assign speciﬁc, rather than relative, lightness values to surfaces?
The ‘‘anchoring theory of lightness perception,’’ introduced by
Gilchrist et al. (1999), proposed to answer the former question in
a novel way. (Though the name of the theory refers to the latter
question, the main feature of the solution adopted by Gilchrist
et al. (1999) – the idea that relative rankings are anchored to a
‘‘highest luminance equals white’’ rule, did not originate with it,
having been previously endorsed by other investigators, e.g. Land
and McCann (1971) and Wallach (1976).) The novelty stemmed
from their assumption that the classic simultaneous contrast illu-sion, in which equiluminant gray squares, one on a white and
the other on a black background, appear slightly different in light-
ness, is a direct result of the same mechanism underlying lightness
constancy. The same mechanism, that is, that allows us to see two
equiluminant surfaces as differing in lightness when one is lying in
low and the other in high illumination was assumed to be respon-
sible for simultaneous lightness contrast. The problem with this
view, of course, is that the squares in the simultaneous contrast
illusion do not appear to differ in their illumination. Thus,
Gilchrist et al. (1999) adopt the position that, in estimating light-
ness, the visual system does not exploit its ability to do what the
authors admit it is capable of doing and ‘‘makes good intuitive
sense’’ (p. 804) – that is, to segregate areas on the basis of illumi-
nation boundaries. Instead, they propose that virtually any and
all grouping principles, not just those correlated with uniform illu-
mination, are employed by the visual system to guide the process
of lightness estimation. Allowing theorists to ‘‘bypass the problem
of edge classiﬁcation’’ (p. 805) is listed as one of the theory’s main
strengths.
The speciﬁc claims of Gilchrist et al. (1999) are difﬁcult to syn-
opsize as they are not particularly coherent. Labelling segregated
areas ‘‘frameworks,’’ they initially state that they ‘‘propose to deﬁne
a framework in terms of gestalt grouping principles’’ and that ‘‘a
framework is a group of surfaces that belong together, more or less’’
(p. 804). These frameworksmay be adjacent, nested, or intersecting.
A page later, the authors suggest that ‘‘the strongest [grouping] fac-
tor is probably coplanarity.’’ (p. 805) This is followed by the classic
gestalt grouping factors, then by edge sharpness, T-junctions, X-
junctions, and, most weakly, retinal proximity. Adjacent lumi-
nances divided by a sharp edge are said to ‘‘belong together
strongly’’ (p. 805) but to be only weakly grouped when separated
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opposed to all or none’’ (p. 805) but no guidance is given as to the
nature of this grading. A framework is said to be stronger or weaker
depending on whether it is supported by a single or several group-
ing factors. Also, the strength of a framework is said to depend
strongly on the number of distinct patches within it, and by its size.
The lack of clarity as to how ‘‘frameworks’’ are determined and
grouping factors are supposed to be graded gave the theory a super-
ﬁcial (and scientiﬁcally inappropriate) advantage in that it allowed
theorists to tailor explanations to selected cases. Gilchrist et al.
(1999) themselves admit that their key concepts of ‘‘belongingness,
framework, and strength of framework obviously require greater
clariﬁcation’’ (829). Despite this ﬂexibility, they cannot avoid pre-
senting cases both of ‘‘success’’ and ‘‘failure’’ of the theory. For
example, though they ‘‘explain’’ the original version of the Gelb
staircase, they cannot explain the version bounded by a white sur-
round. The theory is also silent on the issue of transparency effects,
even though, as Kingdom (2008) has noted, transparencies ‘‘behave
similarly to light’’ (p. 2091). By normal scientiﬁc standards, then,
the anchoring theorywould seem to have failed even as it was being
born, or at least to have been born prematurely.
Fifteen years later, the basic concepts have still not been clari-
ﬁed, the theory continues to fail regularly, and the problem of
transparency has still not been addressed. The theory, in other
words, has not become more viable. If anything, it has become
more obviously unviable, given that the claims of it supporters
have changed to the point where they constitute reversals of the
original proposal at both a conceptual and an experimental level.
The theory, however, was never formally revised, and the altered
claims are consistently represented as though they derive from
the original theory. That this is possible implies either a tolerance
for contradiction or that the theory does not contain falsiﬁable
principles and therefore lacks heuristic value. Below, I offer some
examples of the more striking contradictions discernible within
the original version and between it and later claims.1. Anchoring theorists’ explanation of simultaneous contrast
violates their assumptions
As Economou, Zdravkovic´, and Gilchrist (2007) remind us,
according to anchoring theory the simultaneous contrast illusion
‘‘stems from local anchoring’’ (p. 3). The local groups are said to be
each gray target square and its black or white background. The tar-
get’s lightness is assessed relative to its local background, and this
estimate is then modiﬁed on the basis of its relationship to remain-
der of the display. This description is a problem, because nothing in
the anchoring theory would seem to justify these groupings.
It seems fairly clear that anchoring theorists agree that the gray
squares appear to lie on top of their backgrounds, but I will argue
both this case as well as the possibility that they appear coplanar
with their backgrounds.
If the gray targets are taken to have a ﬁgure–ground relationship
with their backgrounds, then the only grouping factor that would
seem to link them would be retinal proximity, the weakest of the
lot. In contrast, the two gray squares appear to lie on the same level.
According to Zdravkovic´, Economou, & Gilchrist (2012), non-adja-
cent surfaces that appear to lie under the same illumination level
are grouped together fairly strongly (the separation between the
surfaces in that study was 45 cm, much greater than that between
the targets in the typical contrast display). The two backgrounds,
which appear adjacent as well as coplanar, should be most strongly
grouped according to Zdravkovic´, Economou, and Gilchrist (2012)
who state that ‘‘two surfaces that are coplanar, adjacent and share
a sharp boundary are maximally grouped for illumination’’ (p. 783).
In other words, the two most cohesive ‘‘local frameworks’’ wouldseem to be the two targets grouping together and the two back-
grounds grouping together. Zdravkovic, Economou and Gilchrist
(2012) also assert that occlusion (i.e. ﬁgure-ground) boundaries
are strong segregating factors in anchoring theory. That said, it is
hard to see how, on anchoring theory’s terms, ‘‘the illusion ismainly
attributed to a strong lightening of the target on black due to its
position as highest luminance in the local framework’’
(Economou, Zdravkovic´, & Gilchrist, 2007).
If, on the other hand, the gray targets are taken as coplanar with
their backgrounds, then according to anchoring theory, the whole
display should constitute a single framework. This is also consis-
tent with the stimuli used by Zdravkovic´, Economou, and
Gilchrist (2012), in which parts of surfaces described as coplanar
appear to overlap as ﬁgure and ground.2. Figure and ground
Anchoring theory has generally ignored or downplayed the
issue of ﬁgure–ground relations. In his disc-annulus experiments,
Wallach (1948), had revealed an asymmetry between disc and
annulus in the application of the highest-luminance-white rule.
As Gilchrist et al. (1999) observed, these stimuli ‘‘lend themselves
readily to a ﬁgure–ground analysis’’ (p. 801). However, they argue
that the ﬁgure–ground structure of the stimuli is actually not the
operative factor, but is confounded with area: ‘‘What had appeared
to be a matter of ﬁgure–ground turns out to be a matter of relative
area’’ (p. 801).
Subsequently, however, Economou, Zdravkovic´, and Gilchrist
(2007) conﬁrm the existence of a ﬁgure–ground asymmetry in con-
trast effects. They propose a ‘‘supplement’’ to the anchoring theory
to accommodate these ﬁndings, stating that ‘‘it may be that ﬁgure
belongs to groundmore than ground belongs to ﬁgure’’ (p. 10). This
is clearly not an explanation so much a somewhat mystical
rephrasing of the facts. It does not address the apparent conﬂict
between these investigators’ claims and Gilchrist et al.’s (1999)
rejection of the ﬁgure–ground relationship as a modulating factor
in lightness perception in favor of an ‘‘area rule.’’3. The ‘‘critical test’’ and the role of transparency
An unpublished experiment by Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist
(1995) is described by Gilchrist et al. (1999) as ‘‘a critical test’’ of
the anchoring theory. Here, the presence of a visible penumbra
bisecting a set of coplanar surfaces seems only weakly to inhibit
the application of the highest-luminance-white rule to the entire
coplanar group. As a result, the experiment (as well as a similar
one by Annan et al. (1997)) appears to produce striking failures
of lightness constancy. This ﬁnding was paradoxical in that it
begged the question of how a visual system that apparently
ignores obvious illumination boundaries can routinely succeed in
achieving lightness constancy, but Gilchrist et al. (1999) appar-
ently viewed it as critical proof of the irrelevance of edge
classiﬁcation.
The results and interpretation of these experiments are con-
tradicted by those of Radonjic´ and Gilchrist (2013). They perform
a similar experiment, achieve the opposite result, and reach the
opposite conclusion. (As Blakeslee, Reetz, and McCourt (2008) have
pointed out, the results of Annan et al. (1997) reported in Gilchrist
et al. (1999) and Gilchrist (2006) similarly contradict earlier edge-
substitution experiments (e.g. Gilchrist, Delman, and Jacobsen
(1983)), where a visible illumination edge was shown to segregate
regions and produce lightness-constancy-type effects.) Radonjic´
and Gilchrist (2013) conclude that lightness computations are
limited to ‘‘the target’s most immediate framework deﬁned by a
penumbra’’ (p. 452) and, more generally, that a target’s lightness
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the highest luminance in its plane’’ (p. 451). Similar conclusions
were reached by Gilchrist and Radonjic´ (2010) for pictorial scenes.
Both studies contradict the position of Gilchrist (2006), who con-
tinues to maintain that ‘‘frameworks’’ are not limited to regions
of common illumination and that, in the case of pictures, penum-
bras have only a weakly segregating effect. (It is not clear why
Gilchrist (2006) would have made such an assertion, since con-
stancy effects clearly arise in the context of pictorial penumbras.)
Oddly, while Gilchrist (2006) does acknowledge a strong segregat-
ing role for penumbras, he continues to refer to Annan et al. (1997)
as a successfully-passed test of the anchoring theory.
Despite contradicting the ‘‘critical test’’ and its corollary, both
Radonjic´ and Gilchrist (2013) and Gilchrist and Radonjic´ (2010)
seem to represent their ﬁndings as straightforwardly consistent
with the ‘‘anchoring theory.’’ Characteristically, Radonjic´ and
Gilchrist (2013) state that: ‘‘Anchoring theory explicitly speciﬁes
units in the image within which target lightness is determined
by identifying factors that segregate frameworks (mainly depth
and shadow boundaries)’’ (p. 450). Earlier, Economou, Zdravkovic´,
and Gilchrist (2007) had made clear that the process involves edge
classiﬁcation: ‘‘Luminance gradients, such as penumbrae, serve to
segregate frameworks (suggesting an illumination boundary)
within the anchoring model’’ (p. 12) and that anchoring theory
‘‘accommodates the important distinction between reﬂectance
and illumination edges’’ (p. 12). Clearly, the theory these authors
are describing is not a theory that ‘‘bypasses edge classiﬁcation,’’
but, rather, one that embraces it. If depth and shadow boundaries
are now held to be the main segregating factors in anchoring the-
ory, then we must ask how anchoring theorists reconcile their
observations with those of the Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist
(1995) and Annan et al. (1997).
We should note that, in each case, the anchoring explanation
involves adjusting the relative ‘‘strengths’’ of coplanarity and pen-
umbra as grouping/segregating forces. That opposite results can
both be rationalized as consistent with the anchoring theory
reveals its lack of falsiﬁability/heuristic value.
An anchoring-theory-incompatible transparency explanation
arguably explains Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist (1995). In Arroyo,
Annan, and Gilchrist (1995), an actually gray surface on the bright
side of a penumbra appeared only slightly less white than an actu-
ally white surface on the shadow side. These results seemed to indi-
cate that luminance values were compared and ranked across the
penumbra, in contrast to the more recent acknowledgement by
anchoring theorists of a strong segregating role for penumbras.
However, (presumably for reasons of methodological convenience),
the bright side of the group of surfaces in these experiments con-
tained no surface lighter than middle gray. Consequently, the con-
trast ratios on that side of the penumbra were lower than those on
the shadow side. As noted by Anderson and Winawer (2005) the
visual system has a bias to treat large reductions in contrast along
an edge as indicating the presence of a transparent overlay (p. 5).
More speciﬁcally, ‘‘the lower contrast side of the edge is likely to
be a transparency with a reﬂective component’’ (Kingdom, 2008,
p. 2091). If the lower contrast ratios of surfaces on the bright side
were interpreted as being due to a grayish overlay they would,
arguably, be perceived as lighter than their luminances would
otherwise dictate, the overlay being perceptually ‘‘stripped away.’’
The explanation of Gilchrist et al.’s (1999) ‘‘critical test’’ may, in
other words, require conceptual tools that the current version lacks
and gives no indication of developing.
Similarly, a stimulus described by Allred et al. (2012) as consis-
tent with the anchoring theory is actually not consistent with any
of the anchoring theory’s claims to date, but is consistent with
known principles of transparency. Speciﬁcally, these authors
employ a set of coplanar surfaces arranged in the form of a check-erboard, sections of which appear, by design, to be more or less
brightly illuminated. The authors describe these stimuli as produc-
ing effects of the magnitude of lightness constancy and invoke the
anchoring theory as a conceptual framework. But the anchoring
theory does not currently account for apparent illumination
boundaries between coplanar surfaces in the absence of a penum-
bra, (and absent ratio-invariant X-junctions). The only apparent
cue underlying these effects are the reduced contrast ratios in
the relevant parts of the checkerboard, which are consistent with
the presence of transparent overlays or with very bright or very
low illumination (resulting in ceiling effects). At best, anchoring
theorists could appeal to the grouping principle of similarity, but
this would not justify the magnitude of the effects. Thus, Allred
et al.’s (2012) stimulus constitutes another failure for the anchor-
ing theory as presently represented.4. Gilchrist (2006), simultaneous contrast, and reverse contrast
As discussed above, it was the classic simultaneous contrast
illusion that led Gilchrist et al. (1999) to attempt to bypass edge
classiﬁcation and in favor of other grouping principles. The subse-
quent adoption of edge classiﬁcation as a core principle has appar-
ently altered anchoring theory’s view of this illusion. Gilchrist
(2014) seems to be describing the classic simultaneous contrast
illusion as an error of edge classiﬁcation when he states: ‘‘The
white and black backgrounds in simultaneous contrast have
perimeters of constant, continuous sign, much like spotlights and
shadows’’ (p. 18). This description, of course, applies to the area
of any homogeneous surface, not only to spotlights and shadows,
and thus seems to be confounding reﬂectance and illumination
boundaries. The fact is that some sharp boundaries produce the
kind of segregation that leads to constancy effects, some to con-
trast effects, and some to neither. It is not clear on what theoretical
basis Gilchrist (2006) is claiming that the borders of the black and
white surfaces in this particular case are classiﬁed as illumination
boundaries. The percept does not support this claim. Furthermore,
why does this (supposed) edge-classiﬁcation error not produce a
constancy effect, but rather an effect six times weaker?
Perhaps the visual system is hedging its bets. If, however, con-
trast illusions are now to be considered by-products of inexplicable
and selective edge-classiﬁcation errors, then Gilchrist’s (2014)
anchoring account of ‘‘reverse-contrast illusions’’ (or assimilation
effects) seems untenable. These are explained on the basis of the
grouping (for the purpose of lightness estimation) of non-contigu-
ous areas via Gestalt grouping principles such as continuity. It does
not seem sensible to argue that the visual system is treating collec-
tions of non-contiguous surfaces – but not the areas between them
– as lying under a common illumination.5. Originality
Anchoring theorists have not been conscientious in keeping
track of their own claims and assumptions, and they have also
been careless in asserting ownership of ideas. If they are now
asserting that according to the anchoring theory, ‘‘the retinal image
is segmented into frameworks based on two main factors: fuzzy
boundaries and depth boundaries (corners and occlusion bound-
aries)’’ (Zdravkovic´, Economou, & Gilchrist, 2012, p. 782) then the
claim is indistinguishable from the view attributed by Gilchrist
(2014) to Kardos (1934): ‘‘According to Kardos (1934) the main
factors in segmentation are depth boundaries (corners and
occlusion boundaries) and penumbras’’ (p. 18). Gilchrist’s (2014)
claim that the background squares in the classic simultaneous con-
trast illusion resemble spotlights or shadows parallels the view of
Helmholtz that ‘‘simultaneous contrast [is] in most instances a
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region as if it was covered by a veiling illumination the color of
its surround’’ (Kingdom, 1997, p. 674). It is not apparent that
anchoring theory has added a higher level of conceptual cohesion
to these individual claims.6. Conclusion
The anchoring theory is demonstrably a label that has been
applied to claims that are vague, shifting, contradictory and concep-
tually incoherent, beginning with the original proposal and contin-
uing throughout the theory’s 15-year lifespan. Yet, it has recently
been referred to as one of ‘‘the most successful approaches to light-
ness perception’’ (Murray, 2013) as ‘‘a useful computational tool’’
and the ‘‘conventional explanation’’ (Vladusich, 2013 p. 2) for the
staircase Gelb effect (2013). It has spawned at least one variant
(Bressan, 2006) and continues to be invoked as a guiding concept
in contemporary literature (e.g. Lee & Brainard, 2014). It is probably
time to reassess its usefulness.References
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